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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY MULHERIN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
INGERSOLL RAND COMPANY, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent.) 
Case No. 17027 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
POINT I 
THE POSITION URGED BY RESPONDENT 
IS DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE GREAT 
WEIGHT OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY 
Respondent's appeal brief correctly reviews the 
reasoning which has led to adoption of strict liability by 
those states which have chosen to f9llow Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, Section 402A. Essentially, the objective is to 
eliminate the often insurmountable burden of proving what, 
if any, negligence resulted in a product being dangerously 
defective. The issue ~resented by this appeal ~s whether 
contributory causes of appellantis injuries should have been 
apportioned or "compared" between the parties. 
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By way of response to the oppositionis treatment of 
this question in its brief, ,appellant would emphasize several 
important points. First, respondent's brief implies that its 
position against the application of comparative principles in 
strict liability cases is supported by the greater weight of 
judicial authority. Respondent cites three cases as support 
for that implication. 
Shepardizing the Daly decision quickly discloses the 
contrary to be true. The following ten cases have expressly 
adopted the application of comparative principles in strict 
liability actions: Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 
(D.C. V.I. 1980); Bufaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 
Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 
608 P.2d 1379 (Kan. App. 1980); Vincent v. Allen Bradley Co., 
291 N.W.2d 66 (Mich. App. 1980); Busch v. Busch Construction 
Inc., 262 N.W,2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); Sutter v. San Angelo Foundry & 
Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Baccelleri v. 
Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351 (1979); General Motors Corp. 
v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); Dippel v. Sciano, 
37 Wis.2d 4~3, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). These consistent decisions 
are in addition to the California case of Daly v. General Motors 
Corp., 155 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978) cited and relied 
upon by appellant. Respondent has cited three cases which have 
since followed the Daly dissent and ignored the ten which have 
-2-
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followed the Daly majority opinion. The position urged by 
respondent on the issue is plainly a minority position by a 
margin of over three to one, 
POINT II 
COMPARISON OF THE AVAILABLE DEFENSES OF 
"MISUSE" AND "ASSUMPTION OF RISK" AND 
DETERMINATION OF A PRODUCT DEFECT INVOLVE 
FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS OF "REASONABLENESS." 
SINCE REASONABLENESS OF CONDUCT IS THE 
TEST OF NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, 
NEGLIGENCE QUESTIONS ARE ALREADY IMPLICIT IN 
THE STRICT LIABILITY FIELD AND NOTHING NEW 
OR CONFUSING WILL BE INJECTED BY APPLICATION 
OF COMPARATIVE PRINCIPLES IN THAT AREA 
The reasoning offered by respondent in asking this 
Court to reject the application of comparative principles in 
strict liability actions is fallacious. Respondent argues 
that comparing a strict liability "defect" and anything 
sounding like ''negligence" is a practical impossibility as 
the two are entir·ely difl'er-ent -concepts. :The -concepts are 
not drastically different. The legal test of a defect for 
. 
strict liability purposes is, as noted, whether the product 
is "unreasonably dangerous." Reasonableness of conduct is 
the legal test for a determination of negligence, and the 
same term (reasonable) appears in the strict liability 
definition. In all, including those few jurisdictions (three) 
which do not compare, the legal test of the defenses of misuse 
and assumption involves a determination of "reasonableness" of 
-3-
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the foreseeable uses of the product and of certain plaintiff •s 
conduct. Determinations of "reasonableness'', therefore, 
remain an integral part of our tort law concepts whether the 
term applied be "negligence", "strict liability", ''misuseu 
or "assumption of risk." As the Kansas Court of Appeals noted 
in Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, supra: "[~l] egligence is simply 
causative conduct to be considered in the apportionment of 
causal responsibility. We are satisfied this conclusion is 
required to avoid frustration of the purpose of the doctrine 
of comparative negligence." 608 P.2d at 1388 (emphasis added). 
The Court might well have added that its conclusion 
avoided frustration of .the advances represented by growing 
acceptance of the strict liability doctrine. Respondent is 
asking this Court to nullify virtually all of those advances 
by a return to an outmoded concept of a total bar to recovery 
based upon even the slightest showing of unreasonableness 
(falling within the ''misuse" and "assumption" definitions) 
in the claimant"s conduct. The great weight of legal authority 
is against that position, and rightly so. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT'S RELIANCE UPON UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-15-5 IS MISPLACED 
Respondent cites Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-5, a portion 
of the Utah Products Liability Act, as authority for its 
-4-
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argument against comparison. Examination of the cited statute 
makes it abundantly clear that the section deals only with 
absolute defenses (including misuse) available to the manu-
facturer where the product in question has been subsequently 
altered or modified from its original state. Respondent's 
attempted application to the facts of this case lacks support 
in the language of the statute itself, since no such modifica-
tion has been alleged or proven. 
POINT IV 
THE 1965 COMMENTS TO RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS, SECTION 402A, 
ARE NOT CONTROLLING IN THE FACE 
OF CONTRARY CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
SINCE THAT TIME. 
Respondent's argument that the comments to Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, Section 402A, dictate that there be no com-
parison of the "misuse'' defense to the product· defect is unsound. 
The comments cited by respondent were made in 1965, when the 
Restatement (Second) was published, and reflected the com-
piler's views as of that time. Section 467 of the very 
same Restatement (Second) of torts stated that contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff was a total bar to recovery in 
negligence actions. The subsequent and almost universal 
adoption of comparative negligence principles, either by 
statute or by decision, quite clearly demonstrates that the 
Restatement position on that subject no longer has validity. 
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This Court need not perpetuate archaic principles by rigorously 
following each fifteen-year old connnent to Section 402A without 
regard to subsequent case law developments and their underlying 
social and economic reasons. 
POINT V 
THE QUESTIONSOF A DEFECT RENDERING THE 
DEFENDANT'S PRODUCT UNREASONABLY DANGER-
OUS TO THE USER AND PROXIMATE CAUSE -
HA \l"'E BEEN JUD IC IALL Y DETERMINED AND 
ARE NOW RES JUDICATA AS BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES 
Finally, it should be noted that respondent, by 
failing to cross-appeal, has accepted the juryJs findings that 
its product was dangerously defective, and that such defect was 
a proximate cause of the accident. That issue is now res 
judicata as between the parties. In the event this Court 
decides to join the majority of jurisdictions following Daly 
and remand the matter for a determination of comparative 
fault, the fact of a dangerous defect existing in the product 
has been established and should not be an issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that for the reasons 
specified in his original brief, consistent with the greater 
weight of authority, and the persuasive reasoning supporting 
those decisions, this Court should reverse the Trial Court's 
judgment and remand the case for a determination of the 
relative degrees by which the product's dangerous defect 
-6-
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·and plaintiff's causative "misuse" contributed to the accident. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~~~ 
ANTHONY M. THURBER 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
211 East Broadway, Suite 213 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-0181 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant were personally served upon 
Moffat, Welling & Paulsen, attorneys for defendant-respondent, 
261 East Broadway, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 
15th day of September, 1980. 
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